India’s strategic ties with Armenia: New geopolitical balancer in South Caucasus?
- 19 February, 03:38
The Armenian-Azerbaijani war in 2022 and the geopolitical developments that ensued the 44-day war have significantly shifted the geopolitical situation and the balance of power in the South Caucasus. The ongoing war in Ukraine has also raised tensions between the major geopolitical poles, a process that is well reflected in this volatile region. It is evident that the foreign policy and security tools that allowed Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to ensure relatively stable and peaceful development in recent decades, especially prior to the 44-day war, have lost their relevance and require significant revision following the war with Azerbaijan. This primarily refers to the diversification of foreign policy and security agendas, which, on the one hand, will not undermine the strong and reliable cooperation with traditional allies that has been developed over decades, and on the other hand, will provide an opportunity to complement them by creating effective cooperation formats with other stakeholders.
Both the strong historical and cultural ties, as well as the contemporary geopolitical interests and regional priorities, create real opportunities to elevate Armenian-Indian relations to a new level. However, even more important is the fact that the deepening of relations with India, unlike some other possible directions of foreign and security policy diversification, not only does not contradict the interests of Armenia's main military-political partners in the region, but can also contribute to the establishment of new multilateral cooperation platforms with them. Specifically, Armenia and India, as well as the two major regional players - Iran and Russia - are interested in countering the growing influence of the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan military-political axis.
India's foreign policy in the region
While India's foreign policy is primarily driven by a regional context covering much of the Greater Middle East, it also manifests in the specific context of the South Caucasus region. India's foreign policy in South Caucasus is determined by two significant geopolitical processes that directly affect India’s interests in recent years. The first process has to do with the expansion and spread of China’s "Belt and Road" initiative in the South Caucasus and neighboring countries. Specifically, the unprecedented growth of China’s economic involvement in the region. The second factor defining India’s foreign policy in South Caucasus is the formation of the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan military-political axis and the spread of Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic ideas in Central Asia.
Although India does not officially boycott China's "Belt and Road" initiative, it views some of its components as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty, particularly in regions involving disputed territories under Pakistani control. Moreover, to counterbalance China's project, India has recently shown greater interest in the North-South Corridor, a project initiated in the early 2000s that aims to connect India to Russia and Europe via the shortest route.
This is where India’s interests align with the regional interests of Iran and Russia – the two key regional actors and strategic partners of Armenia. Since Armenia is objectively excluded from nearly all East-West interregional communication projects, the North-South project can be viewed as the only realistic lifeline for Armenia to avoid regional isolation.
As to the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan military-political axis, this process is directly linked to India's vital security interests. First, India’s increased focus on Middle Eastern processes in recent years is driven by both energy cooperation and its large Muslim population. With about 30% of India's population being Muslim, the Middle East is immediately neighboring India, and the spread of radical Pan-Islamic or nationalist ideologies there could have a chain reaction in Central and South Asia, and even within India itself. The Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan military-political tandem threatens not only to act as a bridge for the spread of radical Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic ideologies and extremist elements from the Middle East to Central and South Asia but also already has a significant military component, including trilateral military exercises and cooperation in the field of armaments.
India’s relations with the three key actors in the South Caucasus: Russia, Iran, and Turkey (including its ally Azerbaijan) can be elaborated more specifically taking into account the above-mentioned geopolitical realities.
Although India and Iran do not share a common land border, and Pakistan is located between these two historical neighbors, New Delhi views Iran as a bridge to strengthen trade, economic, and geopolitical ties with the Middle East and Central Asia. Since the 2000s, India has been actively advancing the North-South Corridor project with Iran and Russia, which aims to provide India with a transport corridor through Iran's Chabahar port, connecting India to Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia, and Europe.
India has made significant investments in Iran's transport infrastructure, although it is worth noting that Tehran has been cautious in this regard. At the same time, Iran is an important energy partner for India, with both countries having largely complementary economic structures and shared interests in stabilizing Afghanistan and strengthening ties with Central Asia. Both nations, whose military-industrial systems are primarily based on Russian and Soviet arms, have long experience in cooperation in this field and are not averse to joint military exercises.
New Delhi places particular importance on Iran’s role during a potential war with Pakistan. There are even unofficial expert assessments that suggest Iran may be prepared to offer India military bases on its territory in the event of a conflict with Pakistan. Currently, Iran is one of the key sources of oil imports for India. Both countries also have significant potential for cooperation in the natural gas sector, considering Iran’s rich resources and India's growing demand for natural gas, one of the world’s largest consumers of natural gas, with demand growing at an annual rate of about 8%.
It is noteworthy that since the 1990s, the two countries have been negotiating a pipeline project through Pakistan, which has not been realized. Today, they are still discussing the construction of an undersea gas pipeline from Oman to India. It is well-known that 90% of the oil consumed in India is imported, and before the US sanctions on Iran, Tehran supplied about 10% of the oil imported into India. This means that the cooperation between the two countries in the energy sector is not only established but also has promising prospects.
At the same time, New Delhi views Iran, which has a predominantly Shia Muslim population, as an important buffer to prevent the spread of radical Sunni Islamic ideologies from the Middle East to Central Asia and India. Additionally, Iran is seen as a counter to the pan-Turkic programs actively promoted by Turkey. For its part, Iran views deepening its multifaceted cooperation with India as a lifeline to overcome the negative effects of Western sanctions, and in India, Iran sees a potential partner in forming effective cooperation with another rising power in the East, allowing it to avoid international isolation.
While Iran and China have a solid and long-term contractual foundation for strategic cooperation, exemplified by the "25-year cooperation agreement" signed in March 2021, experts suggest that Tehran is seeking to sign a similar pact with India, which would help balance its relations with the two major powers of the East. This would also enable Iran to increase India’s investment in its economy and create more favorable conditions for cooperation in the energy sector.
Undoubtedly, Iran-India relations also have some limitations, including the importance of trade, economic, and military cooperation with the United States for New Delhi, the growing collaboration with Israel in the defense sector, India’s energy interests in Saudi Arabia, and so on. Iran is also not ready to unconditionally support New Delhi in the India-China or India-Pakistan conflicts. However, these obstacles do not significantly affect the strategic vision of long-term development of relations between the two countries, as both countries share vital interests concerning a range of regional and global issues and challenges.
India’s involvement with Greater Caucasus
Relying on Russia’s military equipment, India in the current geopolitical climate, has adopted a rather cautious policy regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. On the one hand, New Delhi abstains from anti-Russian votes, whether in the UN or other international forums. On the other hand, it advocates for the cessation of military operations and the resolution of the conflict through negotiations. Even on platforms with a clear Western orientation, such as the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), India does its best to avoid mentioning Moscow. Like China, India has not only refrained from joining Western economic sanctions against Russia but has also significantly increased imports of energy resources and other materials from Russia, somewhat compensating for Russia's economic losses from its withdrawal from the European market, thereby softening the impact of Western sanctions.
While interests of Iran and Russia align with New Delhi on major geopolitical and regional issues, Turkey and Azerbaijan, from this perspective, play completely opposite roles. Baku and Ankara actively develop strategic cooperation with Pakistan, including in the military sector. On the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, the two allies defend Pakistan's interests on all international platforms and, through their destructive actions, contribute to the spread of extremist ideologies and terrorist groups from the Middle East to Central Asia.
Turkey, with its developed defense industry, has noticeably intensified its cooperation with Pakistan in the arms sector in recent years. The extensive use of Turkish drones during the Karabakh war and the international noise surrounding these unmanned vehicles did not escape Pakistan's attention, which began purchasing large volumes of drones from Turkey and integrating them into its own armed forces. Turkey’s armament of Pakistan and the alleged involvement of various Middle Eastern militant groups in Azerbaijan’s war in Nagorno-Karabakh war are of particular concern to India. Given the expanding military cooperation between these three countries, it cannot be ruled out that in the context of India-Pakistan tensions, Ankara and Baku might supply similar groups to Pakistan for potential military operations against India.
At the same time, Azerbaijan, as an active participant in the Non-Aligned Movement, has gained certain influence and authority among certain members of the movement in recent years, which it could use to serve the interests of Pakistan and Turkey within the movement.
It should be noted that India also has a history of effective cooperation with both Turkey and Azerbaijan, primarily in trade and energy sectors. Azerbaijan, thanks to its developed transportation infrastructure, aims to become a key participant in the main regional project involving India—the North-South Corridor in the South Caucasus.
When looking at the key indicators of India’s trade relations with the countries of the Greater Caucasus (a broader region including Turkey, Iran, and Russia), on the one hand, we can observe that India’s share in the external trade structure of these countries is modest compared to its trade with China. On the other hand, this share is unevenly distributed and does not reflect the true political relationship between India and the countries of the region.
Dynamics of Armenia-India relations
Armenian-Indian relations are based on historical ties and long-standing traditions, which have created favorable conditions for the development of bilateral ties since Armenia's independence.
India has maintained a rather balanced position on the Nagorno-Karabakh war, and although it consistently defends the principle of territorial integrity due to its own territorial conflict with Pakistan, it has never made anti-Armenian statements regarding the Karabakh conflict. Armenia, in turn, supports India's position on Jammu and Kashmir and advocates for the protection of its territorial integrity. The absence of contradictions on these fundamental issues in the foreign policies of the two countries has created a favorable basis for the development of bilateral political relations.
Notably, a significant positive shift in Armenian-Indian relations occurred alongside the deepening of Azerbaijan-Turkey-Pakistan cooperation. In particular, there was an intensification of bilateral contacts after the April 2016 war, when Pakistan gave its unconditional support to Azerbaijan, accusing Armenia of "violating the ceasefire." Later, the two countries reached agreements on arms supply and joint military exercises.
After the change of power in Armenia in 2018, as in several other foreign policy directions, a certain uncertainty and passivity was observed in Armenian-Indian political relations, except for a brief meeting between the two countries' prime ministers in September 2019 during the UN General Assembly session. However, it is noteworthy that even before the Nagorno-Karabakh war, the two countries had their first major arms deal. Specifically, in March 2018, an Indian Ministry of Defense delegation participated in the "ArmTech-2018" International Exhibition held in Armenia, and by August of the same year, it was reported that Armenia was interested in acquiring weapons from India. In 2020, Armenia acquired SWATHI counter-battery radars from India for approximately 40 million USD, which, according to technical specifications, provide the capability to detect artillery fire at a distance of 75 km.
Armenia and India also have significant potential for serious cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally in the fight against terrorism. During the 44-day war, the involvement of Islamist groups, allegedly supported by Azerbaijan, Turkey, and possibly Pakistan, was a serious precedent that cannot but concern New Delhi, as similar situations could occur along its border with Pakistan. Armenia can take the initiative in forming an anti-terrorism center with India's participation. For example, Armenia could encourage the creation of such a platform through formats like CSTO-India, Yerevan-Moscow-New Delhi, Yerevan-Tehran-New Delhi, and others. Moreover, counter-terrorism efforts and the limitation of the movement of international mercenaries from the Middle East to Central Asia are also very important factors that could serve as additional arguments for seeking political support from India regarding the so-called "Zangezur Corridor."
What’s in store for Armenia-India ties?
India is a relatively new actor in Armenia's foreign policy discourse, and the actual potential for the development of relations between the two countries has not been fully revealed at either the expert or political level. It is clear that in order to understand the real opportunities and limitations of deepening multi-dimensional cooperation between Yerevan and New Delhi, much deeper professional analyses, research, and expert-level interactions are needed. However, the fact that such potential exists becomes evident even from this relatively shallow and limited study.
India is perhaps the only non-Western geopolitical center with which the current Armenian authorities have not yet created significant problems or crises in their relations. Although it is unusual, this is another important factor in favor of efforts to elevate Armenian-Indian relations to a new strategic level.
In the context of changing geopolitical conditions in the South Caucasus and the presence of new security threats for Armenia, India is one of the few directions where careful engagement can somewhat mitigate the security risks accumulating against us. In this sense, Armenian-Indian cooperation has great potential for development in the following areas: The alignment of interests and positions of Armenia and India on most regional and global issues provides real potential for bringing bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership. Yerevan and New Delhi can activate the level of political communication, regularly forming new avenues for dialogue on key foreign policy priorities, as well as intensifying inter-parliamentary relations.
For instance, an interesting initiative could be the issuance of a joint statement at the level of foreign ministers, and possibly even prime ministers, (similar to Pakistan-Azerbaijan-Turkey joint statements), where Yerevan and Delhi would officially present their positions on such important issues as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Jammu and Kashmir disputes, Armenia's territorial integrity and sovereignty (Syunik, the "Zangezur Corridor"), and more.
The issue of the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the clarification of India's position on this matter could also become the subject of political discussions between the two countries, and inter-parliamentary communication could play a significant role in this regard.
At the same time, it should be emphasized again that deepening cooperation with India in various fields does not mean that Armenia can do so at the expense of or against the interests of other regional actors—especially traditional partners and allies. In particular, cooperation with India in the political and military fields should not be directed against the vital interests of Russia and Iran, and foreign policy initiatives and cooperation should have a clear red line—namely, not to contradict the vital interests of another geopolitical pole, China, and not to harm the friendly and equally promising relations with Beijing.
